Department of Economics
University College London
I am an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics at University College London and a Research Affiliate at CEPR. I specialize in Economic Theory and Industrial Organization. I am interested in a wide range of topics such as dynamic nonlinear pricing of durable and storable goods, network and coalition formation, and secondary markets. Here is my .
I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both an absence of intergroup collaboration and excessive intragroup collaboration lead to inefficiency. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of efficient outcomes in winner-takes-all tournaments. I show that the use of transfers does not repair efficiency.
Quantitatively, we investigate the allocative and welfare effects of secondary
markets for cars. An important source of gains from trade in these markets is
the heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for higher-quality (newer) goods,
but transaction costs are an impediment to instantaneous trade. Calibration of
the model successfully matches several aggregate features of the U.S. and
French used-car markets. Counterfactual analyses show that transaction costs
have a large effect on volume of trade, allocations, and the primary market.
Aggregate effects on consumer surplus and welfare are relatively small, but
the effect on lower-valuation households can be large.
This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing of storable goods. We show
that storability imposes novel constraints on a monopolist's ability to
extract surplus. We then show that the attempt to relax these constraints
can generate cyclical patterns in pricing and sales, even when consumers are
homogeneous. Thus, the model provides a novel explanation for sales that
does not rely on discriminating heterogeneous consumers. Enriching the model
to allow for buyer heterogeneity in storage technology, delivers the
prediction that larger bundles are more likely to be on sale.
Work in progress
Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly,
joint with V. Bhaskar
R&R at RAND Journal of Economics,
We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus ex post heterogeneity in preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare, consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing the profits of the first period seller, relative to the situation where consumption choices are observed by the later seller.